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ABSTRACT
Problems of racial discrimination in the imposition of capital sentences, disclosure of
misconduct by prosecutors and police, inconsistency in the quality of defense
afforded capital defendants, exoneration of death row inmates due to newly available
DNA testing, and, most recently, controversies surrounding the potential for cruelty
in the execution process itself continue to complicate views about the morality,
legality, and practicality of reliance on capital punishment to address even the most
heinous of homicide offenses. Despite repeated efforts by the Supreme Court to craft
a capital sentencing framework that ensures that death sentences be imposed fairly in
light of the offenses committed and character of the offenders, perhaps the most
profound questioning about capital punishment policy has come from within the
Court itself. Capital punishment remains a difficult problem both in terms of
constitutional criminal procedure and sound public policy. It will likely remain so for
some time to come based on the Court’s unwavering commitment to its implicit
holding in Furman v. Georgia that execution does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he forty-year history of the Supreme Court’s capital punishment
jurisprudence, set in place by its decision in Furman v. Georgia,1
has been marked by a determined intervention in the administration of
the death penalty. The Court’s continuing interest in reviewing death
sentences has, in a very real sense, touched on virtually every aspect of
the criminal process2 and has reshaped concepts underlying the very
heart of the capital punishment debate.3 In Furman, the Supreme Court
essentially voided all existing state capital punishment statutes only a
year after it had generally upheld the death penalty in the companion

1
2

3

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding that prosecutors have
a duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense); Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319 (2006) (discussing the rules governing the admissibility of
evidence indicating another’s guilt); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)
(establishing an indigent’s right to assistance of forensic expert); Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (establishing that the admission of a coerced
confession as “trial error” is subject to the harmless error test); Turner v.
Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (establishing a right to voir dire jurors as to racial
bias in interracial capital case); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005)
(remanding for consideration of due process issues due to prosecutor’s use of
inconsistent theories in pursuing death penalty against co-defendant in severed
trial); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (overturning death penalty where
counsel failed to examine prosecutor’s file on defendant’s prior conviction
admitted at capital sentencing hearing); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)
(holding that it was improper to shackle the defendant at capital sentencing
hearing).
For instance, one of the critical questions regarding the constitutionally
acceptable use of capital sentences has involved the imposition of the death
penalty for rape. As death was an acceptable alternative penalty for rape and
other serious felonies at the common law, it informed considerations of the
scope of capital punishment in light of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of
“cruel and unusual” punishment. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Nonetheless, the Court held early
on in the post-Furman capital punishment revival that imposition of a death
sentence for rape of an adult woman offended proportionality protections. See
id. at 600. The question of constitutional prohibition against the imposition of
the death penalty for the rape of a child, even when State statutory criteria for
determining when the capital sentence may be appropriate exists, was addressed
much later in Kennedy v. Louisiana, with the majority holding that the
imposition of death where life was not taken was impermissible. 554 U.S. 407,
421 (2008).
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cases of McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio.4 In these
cases, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice John Marshall
Harlan during his last term on the Court, rejected an attack based upon
the unguided exercise of discretion in imposing a death sentence by
the capital sentencing authority5 whether jury or judge.6 The changing
view, reflected in the rejection of the Georgia7 and Texas8 capital
murder statutes by the Furman Court, corresponded with a dramatic
and historic change in the Court’s composition,9 as the four Furman
4

5

6

7

8

9

402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g denied, McGautha v. California, 406 U.S. 978
(1972), but vacated in part and reh’g granted, Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941
(1972) (remanding to the Supreme Court of Ohio insofar as the imposition of the
death penalty was undisturbed, to be disposed of in light of Furman).
The majority upheld the California process in which the jury exercised its
discretion to impose a capital sentence without statutory criteria guiding its
exercise of discretion. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207–08. While finding no federal
constitutional requirement for the employment of criteria by which to channel
the sentencing jury’s discretion, the majority noted the proposed capital
sentencing approach taken in the Model Penal Code which provides specific
direction to capital juries regarding the circumstances under which imposing the
death penalty is warranted. Id. at 221–25. The companion case to McGautha,
Crampton v. Ohio, questioned whether the unitary trial in which the jury
considered the questions of guilt and punishment in a single proceeding violated
due process. Id. at 192.
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in both cases. Id. at 226. In
Justice Douglas’ dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, he
argued that the unitary trial system in place in Ohio unfairly compromised
Crampton’s right to testify in support of his punishment case by subjecting him
to cross-examination on matters that would otherwise not have been heard by
the jury on the question of his guilt. Id. at 239 (“That ‘undeniable tension’
between two constitutional rights . . . should lead to a reversal here. For the
unitary trial or single-verdict trial in practical effect allows the right to be heard
on the issue of punishment only by surrendering the protection of the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). In Justice Brennan’s dissent, in
which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined, he argued that the capital
sentencing procedures used in both California and Ohio violated due process by
failing to provide standards or criteria to guide the discretion of the sentencing
authority in determining whether to impose the death sentence. Id. at 248, 251–
52.
Furman was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 252 (1972). In a companion case, Jackson v. Georgia, the
petitioner was convicted of rape under Georgia law and sentenced to death. Id.
Id. at 239 (discussing the Texas statute in Branch v. Texas, a companion case to
Furman, which authorized the death penalty for rape).
The dramatic shift in the Justices’ views on capital punishment evident in the
McGautha/Furman sequence is not adequately explained by a changing

168

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 164

dissenters—Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and
William Rehnquist—had all been recent appointees of President
Richard Nixon.10 During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger the Court
both retreated from11 and expanded upon the well-known progressive
posture set by the Warren Court in the field of criminal procedure.12
The Warren Court’s posture reflected concerns that violations of civil
rights of African-Americans were often most readily exposed in the
context of the criminal justice system.13
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The rejection of existing capital sentencing schemes by the fivevote plurality in Furman did not serve the ultimate goal of
abolitionists. Instead, within four years, newly drafted and adopted

10

11

12

13

composition of the Court however, since Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and
Marshall, members of the Furman plurality, all served on the Court in both
cases. For discussions of the unusual shift in the Court’s position on capital
punishment over consecutive terms, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2007), and Robert A. Burt,
Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1741, 1754–62 (1987).
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 896 (2008) (“While
President Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointments did not emerge as
consistently conservative picks, on balance, they moved the Court in a more
conservative direction.”).
The Court’s conservative turn during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger
prompted publication of one of the most influential law review articles, William
J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977), in which Justice Brennan argued that litigants should
rely on state constitutional protections in order to avoid retrenchment on federal
constitutional protections by conservative elements within the Court. See id. at
501.
While Chief Justice Burger joined much of the retreat from the Warren Court
initiatives, he also occasionally advanced them in a significant way. For
example, in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), he wrote the majority
opinion recognizing the right of an accused to interlocutory appeal for review of
a prior jeopardy claim to avoid “the personal strain, public embarrassment, and
expense of a criminal trial more than once for the same offense.” Id. at 661.
E.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478–479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“It is important to recall what motivated Members of this Court at the genesis
of our modern capital punishment case law. Furman v. Georgia was decided in
an atmosphere suffused with concern about race bias in the administration of the
death penalty—particularly in Southern States . . . .”).
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capital punishment statutes were before the Court.14 These postFurman statutes were designed to address the concerns of Justices
Potter Stewart and Byron White, who had joined in the Furman
judgment and focused on the infrequency and apparent random use of
the death penalty, rather than holding that the death penalty itself could
not be constitutionally imposed.15
Though the Court rejected many mandatory capital sentencing
statutes, which were often the result of states’ legislative efforts to
comply with Furman,16 the Court upheld capital sentencing schemes in
the 1976 decisions in Gregg v. Georgia,17 Proffitt v. Florida,18 and
Jurek v. Texas.19 These schemes in these cases limited the range of
homicides for which a death sentence could be imposed, and required
consideration of the offender’s character and individual circumstances
when determining whether a death sentence was appropriate. The
approval of state capital sentencing schemes that allowed sentencing
authorities to impose death only after considering mitigating factors
served to justify the imposition of non-capital sentences when
balanced against factors supporting death and led to a series of
decisions requiring the broad admissibility of mitigating circumstances
evidence.
The Court has consistently upheld the right of capital defendants to
offer evidence of circumstances that mitigates their culpability or that
14
15

16

17
18
19

See cases cited infra notes 17–20.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“[T]hese sentences are ‘unusual’ in the sense that the penalty of death is
infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is
extraordinarily rare.”); id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring) (“executed
defendants are finally and completely incapacitated from again committing rape
or murder or any other crime. But when imposition of the penalty reaches a
certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing
general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied.”).
E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637–
38 (1977) (holding mandatory death sentence for murder of police officer
unconstitutional); Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82–85 (1987) (holding
unconstitutional a Nevada statute imposing mandatory death sentence for an
inmate who commits murder while under life sentence); Williams v. Oklahoma,
428 U.S. 907 (1976) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration in
light of Woodson).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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warrants a sentence other than death.20 For those defendants for whom
mitigating circumstances result in rejection of capital punishment, the
individualized sentencing considerations imposed in the Court’s
jurisprudence is undeniably favorable. But over time the Court’s
micromanagement of state capital sentencing procedures to ensure
consideration of mitigating circumstances evidence in deciding
punishment necessarily led to a rather curious consistency problem, as
noted by Justice Antonin Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Walton v.
Arizona21:
Since the individualized determination is a unitary one (does this
defendant deserve death for this crime?) once one says each
sentencer must be able to answer “no” for whatever reason it
deems morally sufficient (and indeed, for whatever reason any one
of 12 jurors deems morally sufficient), it becomes impossible to
claim that the Constitution requires consistency and rationality
among sentencing determinations to be preserved by strictly
limiting the reasons for which each sentencer can say “yes.” In
fact, randomness and “freakishness” are even more evident in a
system that requires aggravating factors to be found in great detail,
since it permits sentencers to accord different treatment, for
whatever mitigating reasons they wish, not only to two different

20

21

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607–08 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a statute
which permitted the sentencer to consider only those mitigating factors
enumerated in the statute); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–17 (1982)
(holding that capital defendant must be permitted to offer evidence relating to
childhood circumstances which could reasonably influence emotional
development); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (ruling that the
defendant’s record of behavior while previously imprisoned or jailed pending
capital trial admissible); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (holding
that evidence of mental impairment due to developmental disabilities is
admissible as mitigating factor in capital sentencing, but execution of mentally
impaired was not per se cruel and unusual). Penry was eventually overruled on
substance in Atkins v. Virginia when the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded, leaving open the degree of
impairment that must be shown to avoid the imposition of the death penalty. 536
U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002). Instances of less significant impairment would still
require consideration as mitigating circumstances.
497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that after a determination of guilt has been
made, a judge’s singular determination of the presence or absence of
aggravating factors in death penalty sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury in capital prosecutions). Justice Scalia’s history of the Court’s
Furman jurisprudence is far more comprehensive than attempted here. See
Walton, 497 U.S.at 656–76.
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murderers, but to two murderers whose crimes have been found to
22
be of similar gravity.

Justice Scalia correctly identifies a persistent problem with the Court’s
capital sentencing jurisprudence: the virtually unlimited reliance on
mitigating circumstances, or evidence suggesting that mitigation is
warranted, permits some capital defendants whose offenses mirror
those committed by others similarly situated, to escape the death
penalty based upon factors that lead capital jurors to reject death. For
Justice Scalia, the Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence has resulted in
an essentially irrational approach to solving the problems identified by
Justices Stewart and White in Furman.
The statistics regarding the actual use of the death penalty,
particularly in terms of executions, bears out the perception that after
some thirty-five years of Court-directed innovation, the landscape of
capital punishment is much the same as it was when Furman was
decided in 1972.23 The execution record for the thirty-three states that
impose capital punishment, the federal government, and the United
States military, collectively the thirty-five jurisdictions in which a
death sentence is an authorized punishment for murder, shows just
how sporadic and freakish capital sentencing remains.24 For the past
several years, executions nationally are running at about fifty per
year.25 Since Furman, the greatest total number of executions in any
year was ninety-eight in 1999.26
The overall problem implicit in the Court’s direct and indirect
architecture developed to limit the number of homicides found to
warrant death sentences quite simply, is that the universe of eligible
offenses and offenders has limited both the potential and actual
imposition of capital sentences. In short, the Court’s process of
refining capital sentencing has, at its threshold, imposed significant
restrictions on the use of capital sentencing, which in turn has caused
its use to be more sporadic and, perhaps, more freakish than would
have proved acceptable to the aims of Justices Stewart27 and White28
in their Furman concurring opinions.29
22
23

24
25
26
27

Id. at 666–67.
See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2012),
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 1 (46 in 2010, 43 in 2011, and 43 in 2012).
Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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III. JUDICIAL RETROSPECTION: THE FLAWED SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Whether Justices Stewart and White would today rethink their
positions in post-Furman cases upholding state death sentencing
schemes, in light of their experience, is arguable. However, two
Furman dissenters ultimately repudiated their support for capital
sentencing. Justice Lewis Powell, who had argued against Justice
William O. Douglas’ Furman conclusion that capital punishment
could not be employed without misuse directed at minorities,30 wrote
the opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp.31 There, the majority rejected an
attack on Georgia’s capital punishment system based on statistical
evidence that showed that death sentences were more frequently
imposed on black capital defendants and an even higher percentage
were imposed in cases where the victims were white.32 The Court held
that the apparent disparities reflected neither an arbitrary nor a racially
discriminatory application of the penalty, as the death sentences
imposed in each case were based upon evidence developed in support
of aggravating circumstances.33
After leaving the Court, Justice Powell reversed his thinking on the
death penalty and stated, in reflection, that he regretted his vote in
McCleskey v. Kemp.34 Later, Justice Blackmun, who had voted to
uphold the death penalty in Furman,35 while disclaiming his personal
support for capital punishment,36 finally came to reject the use of death
28
29

30

31
32
33
34

35
36

Id. at 310–14 (White, J. concurring).
There is nothing original in this analysis, of course. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski &
Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1 (1995) (criticizing the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence). It
seems highly unlikely that the authors would not find developments since their
article’s publication to have compounded the problems they identified.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 448–59 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 245–57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Id. at 286–92.
Id.
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451
(2001); Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 807, 807
(1994) (“Had Justice Powell seen the light while on the bench, the Supreme
Court would have dealt a crippling blow to the death penalty in McCleskey.”).
Furman, 408 U.S. at 405.
Id. at 405–06, 414.
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in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins.37
Discussing McCleskey v. Kemp, he observed:
Despite this staggering evidence of racial prejudice infecting
Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme, the majority turned its back
on McCleskey’s claims, apparently troubled by the fact that
Georgia had instituted more procedural and substantive safeguards
than most other States since Furman, but was still unable to stamp
38
out the virus of racism.

Concluding that he could no longer attempt to find a rational means for
the fair enforcement of capital punishment, Justice Blackmun authored
a dramatic reversal from his position in Furman, concluding with this
simple indictment of the system of capital punishment: “The basic
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine
which defendants ‘deserve’ to die?—cannot be answered in the
affirmative.”39
The defections of Justices Powell and Blackmun from support for
the continued use of the death penalty offered dramatic responses from
judges charged with enforcing constitutional protections and applying
them to the problems posed by the varied, troubling contexts in which
relief is denied and executions proceed. Had they voted with the
plurality in Furman, the past thirty-five plus years of capital litigation
might have been avoided, as their votes would have apparently
provided five solid votes against the death penalty. Instead, Justice
Blackmun took a position consistently examining capital cases for
procedural error and unfairness. In doing so, he contributed to a
middle road on the death penalty within the Court that helped shape
the constitutional requirements for capital sentencing, while never
repudiating the death penalty as an acceptable punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.40

37
38
39
40

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1145.
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American
Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 89
TEX. L. REV. 353, 354 (2010) (discussing the American Law Institute’s decision
to withdraw provisions relating to capital sentencing from the Model Penal Code
due to its perception of the “intractable and structural obstacles to ensuring a
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment” in noting
Justice Blackmun’s ultimate conclusion rejecting capital punishment as an
acceptable sentencing option in light of his experience on the Court).
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The reconsiderations of Justices Powell and Blackmun, Furman
dissenters, have been joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
John Paul Stevens, both of whom questioned the fairness of the death
penalty without formally withdrawing support while still members of
the Court. Justice O’Connor’s delivered her initial criticism to a group
of Minnesota women lawyers in Minneapolis in July 2001, raising the
questions about the likelihood of executions of innocent defendants
and inadequate representation in capital cases.41 She left the Court,
however, without formally changing her position on the death penalty.
Justice Stevens delivered his criticism of the death penalty in his
remarks to the American Bar Association at its annual meeting in
Chicago on August 6, 2005.42 He noted “serious flaws” in the
implementation of capital punishment, suggesting concern over the
appointment of a new Justice following the resignation of Justice
O’Connor.43 He offered extensive criticism of continuing reliance on
capital punishment in Baze v. Rees,44 including its potential for
disparate impact based upon the offender’s race noting, “A third
significant concern is the risk of discriminatory application of the
death penalty. While that risk has been dramatically reduced, the Court
has allowed it to continue to play an unacceptable role in capital
cases.”45 Assessing the weakening logical and historical support for
the death penalty, he concluded:

41

42

43
44
45

See Alan Berlow, A Supreme Court Shocker, SALON.COM (July 4, 2001, 10:14
PM), http://www.salon.com/2001/07/04/oconnor. Justice O’Connor’s address
prompted an editorial in the New York Times that observed that her criticism
suggested that she might be open to a reconsideration of the fundamental
fairness of capital punishment, particularly in light of her disclosure that ninety
death row inmates had been exonerated since 1973, including six the preceding
year. Op-Ed., Justice O’Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at
A16,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/05/opinion/justice-o-connor-onexecutions.html. See also Editorial, Second Thoughts, WASHINGTON POST, July
4, 2001, at A18. For a different, and highly critical view of Justice O’Connor’s
expressions, see Edward Lazarus, Justice O’Connor’s Death Penalty Regrets—
and Responsibility, FINDLAW (July 10, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com
/lazarus/20010710.html (criticizing O’Connor’s decisions upholding limitations
on federal habeas review of state court capital punishment decisions).
Gina Holland, Justice Stevens Criticizes Death Penalty, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.fadp.org/news/SPI-20050808.htm.
Id.
553 U.S. 35, 72, 84–86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgement).
Id. at 85.
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In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in
Furman on his extensive exposure to countless cases for which
death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on my own
experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the
death penalty represents “the pointless and needless extinction of
life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State
[is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative
46
of the Eighth Amendment.”

Nevertheless, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment rather
than rejecting capital sentencing as a matter of Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment dictate as Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas did in
Furman, as Justice Blackmun did in Callins v. Collins, or as Justice
Powell did after his retirement.47
IV. REDRAWING THE MAP OF CAPITAL SENTENCING: STATE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The problems in administering capital sentencing, including its
fiscal costs, have prompted a number of States to abolish the death
penalty despite its continuing viability as a constitutionally acceptable
punishment option for the most heinous of offenses.48 New Jersey,49
46
47

48

49

Id. at 86 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (White, J., concurring)).
For scholarly assessments of Justice Stevens’ evolving position on capital
punishment, see Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s
Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783 (2010), and
James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and
the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2006).
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009: YEAR END REPORT
(Dec. 2009), available at http: //www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009
YearEndReport.pdf.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11–3 (West 2007) (repealing death penalty sentencing
provision in homicide statute). In State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1139–41 (N.J.
2009), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a defendant, convicted of
capital murder, could be sentenced under the life without parole mandatory
sentence authorized under the amended statute, but only if the State could prove
that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. Such a
finding would have resulted in a death sentence under the former provision,
whereas under the amended statute, the court is able to impose the less onerous
sentence of life imprisonment. See Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, sec. 1, 2007
N.J. Laws 1427 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 2008)). If the
State failed to meet its burden however, the defendant would be subject to a life
sentence with a possible thirty-year parole disqualifier, which remains available
under the former statute. Fortin, 969 A.2d at 1134. In this way, the majority
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New Mexico,50 Illinois,51 and Connecticut52 have legislatively rejected
further reliance on capital sentences to address murder, while in other
states significant legislative debate has failed to result in repeal of

50

51

52

sought to avoid the ex post facto claim resting on the imposition of a retroactive
sentence voided by intervening legislative action, an approach sharply criticized
by dissenting Justice Albin, joined by Justice Long. Id. at 1141 (Albin, J.,
dissenting). They maintained that the majority’s decision violated the ex post
facto protections afforded by both the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions. Id. at 1142.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1 (setting out capital sentencing procedure),
repealed by An Act Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing, ch. 11, §§ 1–7, 2009
N.M. Laws 133. The repeal of the State’s capital sentencing statute applied the
change in the law prospectively, requiring the New Mexico Supreme Court to
consider what procedure would apply to capital prosecutions pending at the time
of the effective date of the amendment for which death sentences could still be
imposed. In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Instructions, 222 P.3d 673 (N.M.
2009); In re Death Penalty Sentencing Jury Rules, 222 P.3d 674 (N.M. 2009). In
a pre-repeal case, State v. Fry, the court had rejected a challenge to the State’s
capital sentence process on the ground that the jury sentencing procedure did not
require jurors to find first that proven aggravating circumstances outweighed
mitigating ones before they could impose a sentence of death. 126 P.3d 516,
531–32 (N.M. 2005). After the repeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued a
procedural rule that permitted capital defendants to elect to have separate juries
empanelled for the guilt/innocence phase of trial and the capital-sentencing
phase in the event of conviction. 222 P.3d 674, 674–75 (citing NMRA, Rule 5704(A)).
An Act Concerning Criminal Law, § 10, 2010 Ill. Laws 7779 (codified as
amended at 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/119-1 (West 2012) (“Beginning on the
effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly,
notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the death penalty is abolished and
a sentence to death may not be imposed.”)). See also Christina McMahon,
Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, 16 PUB. INT. L. REP. 83 (2011) (discussing
political pressure stemming from cases of actual death row inmate innocence
and other factors influencing the legislative decision to repeal death penalty).
An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, §§ 1–6, 2012 Conn. Legis.
Service. P.A. 12-5 (S.B. 280) (West) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-46a (2012)). However, Connecticut only abolished the death penalty
prospectively. Id. at § 5(a) (“A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death
for a capital felony committed prior to April 25, 2012 under the provisions of
section 53a-54b in effect prior to April 25, 2012 only if a hearing is held in
accordance with the provisions of this section.”). The prospective law’s
prospective effect exempted eleven men who were on death row, “including
Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven J. Hayes, the men convicted of the Petit
murders.” Peter Applebome, Death Penalty Repeal Goes to Connecticut
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12
/nyregion/connecticut-house-votes-to-repeal-death-penalty.html.
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capital sentencing.53 The New York Court of Appeals held that the
State’s death penalty statute could not be constitutionally applied in
decisions rendered in 200454 and 2007,55 because the “deadlocked
jury” instruction, deemed critical to the operation of the sentencing
process, was found to be constitutionally flawed.56 The legislature has
failed to adopt an amendment to the capital sentencing process
designed to address the court’s reasoning in these decisions.
Meanwhile, the jurisdictions most actively relying on the death penalty

53

54
55

56

See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 40, at 362 n.70 (collecting news reports of
repeal failures in New Hampshire, Montana, and Kansas within the past four
years).
People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007) (applying LaValle to vacate
death sentence imposed at trial).
In LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 356–66, the court held that the “deadlocked jury”
instruction included in the capital sentencing statute was fatally flawed. The
statute required the jury be instructed that in the event it could not reach a
unanimous sentencing decision, “the court will sentence the defendant to a term
of imprisonment with a minimum term of between twenty and twenty-five years
and a maximum term of life.” Id. at 356 n.9 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROV. L.
§ 400.27(10) (2004)). The court explained the flaw in this statutorily mandated
instruction:
Like some other states with death penalty statutes, New York
recognized that jurors should know the consequences of a
deadlock. However, New York’s deadlock provision is unique in
that the sentence required after a deadlock is less severe than the
sentences the jury is allowed to consider. No other death penalty
scheme in the country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they
cannot unanimously agree between two choices, the judge will
sentence defendant to a third, more lenient, choice.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The instruction, as
written and required to be given, would at least theoretically influence a capital
jury to reach a sentencing verdict in order to avoid the possibility that the trial
judge would impose a more lenient sentence than the death or life without parole
options authorized by statute, and available only to juries upon conviction for
capital murder. Later, in Taylor, the court rejected the argument that it should
simply “rewrite the deadlock instruction,” concluding that “the death penalty
sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and it is not within our power to
save the statute.” 878 N.E.2d at 983–84. It held that LaValle compelled that
Taylor’s death sentence be vacated, noting, “[t]he Legislature, mindful of our
State’s due process protections, may reenact a sentencing statute that is free of
coercion and cognizant of a jury’s need to know the consequences of its choice.”
Id. at 984.
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as a punishment option continue to impose capital sentences while the
actual rate of execution remains relatively low.57
The reality of capital sentencing is that the Court’s attempt to
direct development of a process that ensures fair application of the
death penalty fails to satisfy both proponents and opponents of capital
punishment. In operation, the costs and flaws in the system have
frustrated Justices Powell, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens, all of
whom found no Eighth Amendment prohibition in its use and who
struggled with the Court’s mechanism to ensure fairness. For thirtyfive years, since the Court’s action in upholding post-Furman type
legislation in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek,58 the Court’s review of
process either has failed individual cases, or has failed to address the
concerns of Justices Stewart and White. The experience, insight, and
wisdom of those Justices who have examined the reality of capital
punishment should not be dismissed, nor should the concern expressed
by Justice Scalia in Walton be disregarded. For the reality of capital
punishment in practice demonstrates its failure as a matter of policy.
V. LIBERALS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE COURT’S CURRENT POSTURE
It is clear that not a single member of the current Court is
committed to ending capital punishment,59 whether as a matter of
evolving notions of decency that find the death penalty cruel and
unusual, either due to the difficulty in administering capital
punishment consistent with the promise of due process, or simply
based on the enormous costs in expending necessary fiscal or judicial
resources. The apparent consistent support for capital punishment
among current members of the Court may reflect an interesting reality

57

58
59

According to the Death Penalty Information Center, as of November 7, 2012,
3,170 inmates reside on death row in state and federal prisons; 1313 executions
have been performed since 1976 when the Court upheld post-Furman capital
sentencing statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek; and a total of thirty-six
executions have been performed in 2012 alone. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1–3 (2012), available at http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
See cases cited supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Parker v. Mathews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (per curiam and without
dissent) (reversing grant of habeas relief from death sentence in a case nearly
thirty years old).
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of American political life, the concern among national Democratic
leaders that they not be viewed by the public as “soft on crime.”60
This was a perception often linked to the 1988 presidential
campaign when the Democratic nominee, former Massachusetts
Governor Michael Dukakis, was subject to this criticism.61 Governor
Dukakis was linked to a television ad featuring Willie Horton, a
Massachusetts inmate who committed a violent crime while on
furlough from a state prison under a program supported by the
Governor.62 A retrospective assessment of the Governor’s troubling
anti-capital punishment position reports:
In 1988, a question about rape and capital punishment tripped up
Democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis.
Dukakis was asked during a nationally televised debate with
Republican George H. W. Bush whether he’d still oppose the death
penalty if his wife were raped and murdered.
His unemotional, dispassionate answer was ridiculed, and gave
Republicans more material to paint him as an emotionless
63
liberal.

As a presidential candidate, then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton,
apparently learned from the mistake made during the unsuccessful
Dukakis race in 1988. During the campaign, Clinton interrupted his
schedule to return to Arkansas to oversee the execution of Rickey Ray

60

61

62

63

The change in Democratic policy was noted by John Nichols, No Longer
Pushing the Death Penalty, THE NATION (July 27, 2004, 6:28 AM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/no-longer-pushing-death-penalty (discussing an
apparent policy shift away from support for capital punishment during the 2004
presidential campaign of United States Senator John Kerry, and noting that both
former President Bill Clinton and 2000 Democratic nominee Al Gore had
endorsed Democratic platforms that explicitly and frequently endorsed capital
punishment).
Robin Toner, Prison Furloughs in Massachusetts Threaten Dukakis Record on
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, (July 5, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/05/us
/prison-furloughs-in-massachusetts-threaten-dukakis-record-on-crime.html.
See, e.g., The :30 Second Candidate: Willie Horton (Wisconsin Public
Television broadcast 1988), available at http://www.pbs.org/30secondcandidate
/timeline/years/1988b.html. The ad opens with photos of then Vice-President
George H.W. Bush and Governor Dukakis, 1988 U.S. presidential candidates,
comparing their pro and anti-death penalty positions. Id.
McCain, Obama Disagree with Child Rape Ruling, MSNBC.COM (June 26,
2008, 1:26 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25379987.
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Rector,64 whose capacity to understand his pending execution had been
challenged based on a severe brain injury from a self-inflicted gunshot
wound.65 President Clinton would go on to appoint two Justices to the
Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.66
Later, in Buck v. Thaler, Justice Breyer joined Justice Alito’s
statement regarding the denial of certiorari in a case in which the
capital defendant failed to challenge his death sentence due to damning
expert testimony.67 A psychologist was allowed to render an opinion
that the defendant posed a greater threat to commit acts of violence in
the future as a result of his race because defense counsel had opened
up the issue during his direct examination in the capital sentencing
hearing.68 Justice Alito explained that the introduction of this evidence
before the jury would have constituted constitutional error, but for the
fact that Buck’s own attorney had elicited the expert’s opinion.69
Justice Ginsburg voted to deny certiorari, but did not join Justice
Alito’s statement.
Similarly, then-Senator Barack Obama, while campaigning during
the course of the 2008 presidential campaign, aligned himself with the
dissenting opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, where the Court struck
down a statute authorizing imposition of the death penalty for a limited
class of rapes involving child victims,70 thereby establishing his “not
soft on crime” credential:

64

65
66

67

68

69
70

Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty: Arkansas Execution
Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-campaign-death-penalty-arkansasexecution-raises-questions-governor-s.html (“After shooting Officer Martin, Mr.
Rector turned the gun on himself, destroying part of his brain. His lawyers said
that even though he could speak, his mental capacities were so impaired that he
did not know what death is or understand that the people he shot are not still
alive.”).
Rector v. Clinton, 823 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Ark. 1992).
Supreme Court Nominations: Confirmed, LIBR. OF CONG. (July 19, 2012), http:
//www.loc.gov/law/find/court-confirmed.php.
132 S. Ct. 32 (2011) denying cert. in 452 F. App’x 423 (5th Cir. 2011),
temporarily staying execution, 132 S. Ct. 69 (2011), denying cert. to 5th Cir.,
130 S. Ct. 2096 (2010).
132. S. Ct. at 33–34 (statement respecting the denial of certiorari) (Alito, J.,
joined by Scalia & Breyer, JJ.)
Id. at 37.
554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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I have said repeatedly that I think that the death penalty should be
applied in very narrow circumstances for the most egregious of
crimes,” Obama said at a news conference. “I think that the rape of
a small child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime and if a state
makes a decision that under narrow, limited, well-defined
circumstances the death penalty is at least potentially applicable,
71
that that does not violate our Constitution.

In fact, Louisiana referred to the consistent statements made by
Senators Obama and John McCain, the Republican nominee, in
support of the child-rape death penalty sentencing provision in its brief
to the Court.72
In Buck, President Obama appointees Justices Sonia Sotomayor
and Elena Kagan, dissented, but not in opposing the use of the death
penalty, generally.73 Rather, they favored review on procedural
grounds, concerned about claims that Texas had misrepresented the
record in the court below.74
An irony exists, whether substantial or superficial, in the fact that it
is Republican appointees to the Court, Justices Blackmun, Powell,
O’Connor, and Stevens, who have either repudiated capital sentencing
or offered significant criticisms of the capital sentencing process;
appointees who might logically have been expected to persist in
restrained, conservative views on the death penalty, rather than the
presumably more liberal appointees of Democratic Presidents Clinton
and Obama. And perhaps the ultimate irony lies in President Gerald
Ford’s appointment of John Paul Stevens to the Court as the successor
to Justice William O. Douglas, whom Ford had sought to impeach
while serving as House Minority Leader in 1970.75 Justice Stevens’
penetrating indictment of capital sentencing in his concurring opinion
in Baze v. Rees76 reflected his experience in reviewing a process in
71
72

73
74
75

76

MSNBC.COM, supra note 63.
Lyle Denniston, Final Brief on Kennedy v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24,
2008, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2008/09/final-brief-on-kennedy-vlouisiana/.
See 132 S. Ct. at 35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Kagen, J.).
Id. at 36–37.
Professor Michael Dorf offers a very thoughtful analysis of the changing
perspectives of some serving justices whose orientation was that of
“Rockefeller,” or of moderate Republicans before their appointment to the
Court. See Michael C. Dorf, Becoming Justice Stevens: How and Why Some
Justices Evolve, FINDLAW (Apr. 21, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf
/20100421.html.
553 U.S. 35 (2008).

182

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 164

which procedural protections for capital defendants have eroded over
time, in which racial prejudice remains a compelling problem
characterized by juries unreflective of the community from which they
have been drawn, in which unjustified costs are imposed on judicial
and fiscal resources, and in which justice is compromised by the
potential for the wrongful execution of innocent defendants.77
It may be, of course, that significant Court-imposed limitations on
the use of the death penalty in cases of rape,78 the severely mentally
impaired,79 and for capital offenses committed by juveniles80 have
addressed the primary concerns of liberals, including Democratic
appointees to the Court, allowing capital punishment to remain a
viable sentencing option. Or, it may be that the Clinton and Obama
appointees were carefully vetted to determine that they shared their
appointing President’s support for capital sentencing. Regardless, to
date, none of the four Democratic appointees have veered beyond
recognition that the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments does not preclude capital punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the current Court’s position on capital punishment generally
reflects unanimous support for the death penalty as a sentencing
option, recent polling data shows that public support for capital
punishment has decreased. A Gallup Poll in October 2011, for
instance, shows that support for the death penalty has declined to
sixty-one percent of individuals surveyed, the lowest level of support
for capital punishment since the time of the Court’s decision in

77

78

79
80

Id. at 71, 81–86 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, while criticizing use
of the death penalty, concurred in the judgment only, rejecting the specific issue
before the Court regarding the argument that the lethal injection protocol used in
Kentucky violated the Eighth Amendment protection against cruelty in the
infliction of punishment.
See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding Louisiana statute
authorizing death sentence for rape of a child with aggravating factors
unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding death penalty
disproportionate for crime of rape of an adult woman).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2005).
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Furman in 1972; at that time, just forty-nine percent of individuals
surveyed supported the death penalty (see inset).81

Copyright © 2011, Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. Used here with permission. Gallup retains all rights of republication.

The trend in support for the death penalty over the period of time
surveyed shows significant fluctuation, perhaps reflecting public
perceptions of the fairness or factual accuracy in the prosecution
process. It may also reflect public response to perceptions about a
reduction in the prevalence of violent crime. Regardless, the trend
suggests that capital punishment remains an unresolved source of
anxiety with respect to the operation of the criminal justice system.
The notion that execution violates the Eighth Amendment has less
currency now than forty years ago, when a significant coalition of
Supreme Court Justices found compelling, though varying, flaws in
the capital sentencing system. The nation’s experience, and the Court’s
experience, in addressing the problems posed by the death penalty
remains an unsettling problem that will only be addressed over time by
state legislatures.
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Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low,
GALLUP (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-DeathPenalty-Falls-Year-Low.aspx.

